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about committing forces to LAM SON 
719, and in 2014, when ISIS seized 
Fallujah, Maliki allowed the problem 
to fester. In neither case was suppres-
sion of a hostile insurgency put above 
the objective of maintaining a grip 
on power—much to the frustration 
of Washington. As Henry Kissinger 
would later say of LAM SON 719, it was 
an “operation [that was] conceived in 
ambivalence and assailed by skepticism, 
[and] proceeded in confusion.” Today 
what was then the town of Tchepone lies 
abandoned, though the lessons of 1971 
remain fresh. Sander’s work will likely 
remain the definitive record of the Laos 
campaign until such time as archives 
in Hanoi are made fully available.
JOSEPH HAMMOND
Haddick, Robert. Fire on the Water: China, Amer-
ica, and the Future of the Pacific. Annapolis, Md.: 
Naval Institute Press, 2014. 288pp. $37.95 
Robert Haddick proposes a revised U.S. 
strategy toward China. He argues— 
agreeing with recent U.S. national 
security strategies—that continued U.S. 
forward presence is the only option that 
supports the American objectives of “an 
open international economic system; 
respect for universal values around the 
world; and a rules-based international 
order that promotes peace, security, and 
opportunity through stronger coopera-
tion.” He articulates a two-front effort 
to ensure China rises within the existing 
international structure: positive rein-
forcement of good behavior combined 
with significant defense reforms to 
allow punishment of bad behavior. 
Haddick discusses the nature of China’s 
military modernization and how it 
bodes ill for the U.S. ability to punish 
Chinese transgressions against inter-
national order. He believes that current 
U.S. force posture is inadequate be-
cause U.S. air and naval capabilities are 
vulnerable to Chinese land-, air-, and 
sea-launched cruise missiles and ballistic 
missiles. And future U.S. capabilities—
the F-35 in particular—have insuf-
ficient range to operate from existing 
bases under the antiaccess umbrella 
created by these weapons. To counter 
the tactical and operational challenges 
these weapons create he advocates the 
Pentagon develop a new long-range 
bomber and long-range cruise mis-
siles able to penetrate Chinese airspace 
and hold critical targets at risk. He also 
promotes autonomous aerial projectiles 
based on a 1990s DARPA model to 
locate and destroy road-mobile mis-
sile launchers. He argues convincingly 
that his acquisition proposals solve the 
likely tactical and operational problems 
of a future war with China, but he does 
not engage with the highly contested 
literature on the strategic effectiveness of 
airpower. Without a theory of strategic 
effectiveness, he fails to make the case 
that these new capabilities would sup-
port his strategy and influence Chinese 
decision making during crisis or war. 
Additional proposals are designed to 
threaten presumed Chinese fears. These 
include encouraging America’s regional 
allies to develop their own antiaccess 
capabilities on the First Island Chain, 
improving U.S. Navy blockading capac-
ity, developing irregular warfare capacity 
among China’s minority populations, 
and developing antisatellite weaponry. 
However, if China continues its policy of 
“salami slicing,” these weapons and plans 
will never see battle. By incrementally 
challenging the existing regional order, 
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China is, as Haddick agrees, achieving 
its objectives without risking war. Beijing 
understands there is a threshold for U.S. 
military response and will continue to 
operate below it. An American president 
would be loath to fire the first shots over 
the Chinese occupation of an uninhab-
ited island. Haddick therefore argues the 
United States should develop policies to 
encourage China to follow the existing 
international rules in letter and spirit. 
Unfortunately, he does not detail these 
policies, leaving his strategy wanting. 
Haddick states that strategy is about 
managing risk. While much of what 
Haddick proposes seems commonsensi-
cal, it is unfinished, and this poses risks. 
Focusing only on punitive measures 
against possible Chinese actions runs 
the risk of ignoring the ways China 
has played by the rules while further-
ing a mind-set where every develop-
ment in the PLA’s modernization is 
perceived as a threat to U.S. regional 
interests—regardless of Chinese inten-
tions. This book should be read as part 
of an ongoing and equally unfinished 
debate on how to handle a rising China. 
IAN T. SUNDSTROM
Hughes, Wayne P., ed. The U.S. Naval Institute 
on Naval Tactics. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute 
Press, 2015. 192pp. $21.95
The U.S. Naval Institute on Naval Tactics 
is a collection of thirteen essays as-
sembled by Captain Wayne Hughes, 
USN (Ret.)—author of several books, 
most notably Fleet Tactics and Coastal 
Combat and Military Modeling for Deci-
sion Making. Captain Hughes is also 
an accomplished naval officer, having 
served as commanding officer of USS 
Hummingbird (MSC 192) and USS 
Morton (DD 948). Notable authors ap-
pearing in On Tactics include Admiral 
Woodward, RN, who commanded 
British forces in the Falklands War, and 
Giuseppe Fioravanzo, Admiral of the 
Fleet, Italian Navy. On Tactics is part 
of the U.S. Naval Institute’s new Wheel 
Books series, which is a collection of 
books containing some of the Naval 
Institute’s most well-regarded articles 
from Proceedings—and other sources—
on such topics as naval leadership, 
command, strategy, and cooperation. 
On Tactics is well worth the reader’s 
time, and appropriate for both junior 
and senior officers. It benefits greatly 
from Hughes’s insightful commentary 
and tactful editing, which boils the com-
bined length of the selected essays down 
to a manageable 190 pages. Although the 
topic of tactics is broadly applicable to 
all naval communities, surface warfare 
officers will probably have the easiest 
time relating to the selected essays.
Of the thirteen essays in the volume, a 
favorite was “Missile Chess: A Parable,” 
written by Hughes himself. “Missile 
Chess” describes a game created by 
Hughes in which players sit down to play 
a traditional game of chess but with a ma-
jor twist: the players have a fixed number 
of “missiles” that they must distribute 
among their pieces as they see fit. The 
pieces still move according to the rules of 
regular chess, but each time they capture 
an opposing piece they expend one “mis-
sile.” Once a piece’s missile inventory is 
depleted a piece can still move but can no 
longer capture. After he walks us through 
several hypothetical scenarios, it is clear 
that despite its simplicity, missile chess 
nicely elucidates some of the most vex-
ing operational challenges with which a 
modern naval commander must contend.
6779_BookReviews.indd   166 4/27/15   10:54 AM
2
Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 3, Art. 20
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/20
